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Blyer: Some Current Thinking at the Board from Brooklyn and Beyond

SOME CURRENT THINKING AT THE BOARD
FROM BROOKLYN AND BEYOND
Alvin P. Blyer*
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act") is now
seventy-five years old. Recently, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board"), which is authorized to administer the Act, has
had its share of turmoil. Its efficiency has been hampered by having only
two Board members for more than two years, and more recently, by the
Supreme Court's decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, holding
that the two-Board-member panel lacked authority to, among other
things, adjudicate unfair labor practices.2 Indeed, through the years,
there has been a good deal of criticism aimed at the Board for an alleged
lack of efficiency. Nonetheless, the statute endures, and much more
often than not, it works.
In October 2010, there was a great deal of talk about the mid-term
political elections. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to discuss two
interesting and unusual election proceeding that arose in a different
arena-the Brooklyn office of the NLRB. These cases caused some
difficulty for the Board. In one case, the election was held one-and-ahalf years ago, and in the other, the election was conducted more than
seven years ago.
One of the two matters was Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.3 In
this case, the employer filed timely objections after the Board conducted
an election and the union received a majority of the votes cast. 4 On
August 27, 2010, the Board issued its decision overruling the employer's
objections and confirming the union's victory.5
The objections that caused disagreement between the only two
members on the Board at the time involved two letters written to the

*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board, Region 29 (Brooklyn, New York).
130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
See id. at 2444.
355 N.LR.B. No. 163, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 27, 2010).
See id. at 1 n.1.
See id. at 1.
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employer-one written by a U.S. Congressman and the other by a New
York State Senator.' The lawmakers distributed the letters to eligible
voters before the union election and expressed a concern that the
employer might not have been treating its employees fairly.7 The letters
warned of forthcoming layoffs, expressed support for the union and
noted that the employer opposed the union. 8 The politicians also
referenced their positions on transportation committees that oversee the
employer's operations. 9
In overruling the objections, the Board majority noted that public
officials are entitled to express their personal opinions about
unionization efforts to an employer and contended that those reading
their letters would reasonably construe them as expressions of their
personal views on the subject rather than as endorsements of the union. o
More significantly, the decision rejected the dissent's view that the
letters would be misinterpreted by voters because of the references to
their positions on the transportation committees." The dissent noted that
these letters may be construed as veiled threats to take action adverse to
the employer's business interests unless the employees voted in favor of
the union.12 In short, the Board members disagreed over how employees
would perceive the written comments of the politicians. The majority
opined that the letters would not mislead reasonable employees to
conclude that the government (including the Board) was supporting the
union or that adverse consequences would be visited on the employer by
these politicians absent a union victory."
The second case, Independence Residences, Inc.,14 also decided on
August 27, 2010, involved an election held in 2003.'s The outcome of
the election was decidedly in favor of representation.16 After employees
cast their ballots, the employer filed timely objections, claiming that
campaign laws of New York State prevented a fair election from being
held.' 7 Specifically, Section 211-a of the New York Labor Law
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See id.
See id.
See id. at 3 (Schaumber, dissenting).
Id.
See id at 2.
See id. at 2-3.
See id at 3-4 (Schaumber, dissenting).
See id at 2.
355 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 27, 2010).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 2.
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prohibited the employer from using state funds to: (1) train managers,
supervisors, or other administrative employees in methods to encourage
or discourage unionization; (2) hire attorneys, consultants, or contractors
to encourage or discourage unionization; and (3) pay employees whose
principal job duties are to engage in such activity.' 8 It also provided that
records must be kept to show that state funds were not used for
prohibited purposes, and set forth strong civil penalties for noncompliance.' 9 The employer claimed that the law was invalid because it
was pre-empted by federal law and asserted that it was compelled to
comply with the law in light of the penalties for non-compliance since
the law had not yet been declared invalid. 20 Nonetheless, the employer
had at its disposal $130,000 in private donations and interest income to
wage an anti-union campaign. 2 ' The employer used some of the funds to
pay for the flyers and letters it sent to employers pointing out the
wisdom of casting votes against union representation.22 The employer
also held two mandatory employee meetings during work hours shortly
before the election and conducted group and individual meetings to
advise eligible employees that unionization was not in their best
interest.23 The employer stated that it would have run its campaign
differently if it did not have to comply with section 211(a).2 4 The
employer testified that it would have conducted a more "aggressive,"
"stronger" campaign and would have directly told employees to vote
no. 25 In addition, the employer discussed the possibility of hiring a
consultant, which it did not do.26
In overruling the employer's objections based on section 211-a, the
Board assumed, arguendo, that the state law at issue was pre-empted,
but declined the employer's invitation to conclude, as a matter of law,
that the election be set aside.27 In this particular situation, the Board
majority felt the proper focus was on whether "the atmosphere was so
tainted as to warrant setting aside the election."28 Put differently, the
Board was concerned with whether the "surrounding conditions

18.
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20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(2) (McKinney 2002).
Id. § 211-a(3)-(4).
See Independence, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 153, slip op. at 1.
See id. at 3.
See id.
See id
See id at 4.
Id.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 7-8.
Id at 8 (quoting Delta Brands, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 252, 253 (2005)).
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enable[d] employees to register a free and untrammeled choice for or
against a bargaining representative." 2 9
Applying that language, the Board noted that section 211-a did not
prohibit all kinds of campaign activity. Rather, the statute limited the use
of state funds to support certain specified activities.30 Further, the Board
pointed out that the state law at issue imposed no limitation on an
employer's right to use money from non-state sources for a union
campaign. 3 1 According to the Board, the employer engaged in a vigorous
campaign against the union (which included the commission of unfair
labor practices), and that the election results were not close.32
The dissent contended that the state law at issue "plainly chilled the
exercise of covered employers' section 8(c) rights, and the concomitant
section 7 rights of employees to access to [sic] information in opposition
to unionization." 33 However, this argument did not get much assistance
from the employer who did a poor job in elaborating how section 211-a
stifled its campaign, other than to suggest it might have hired a
consultant and would have directly told its employees to vote no.34 Thus,
when the dissent stated that the majority gave controlling weight to its
judgment that the employer was able to campaign "enough," the
dissent's view was not enhanced by the employer's failure to establish
what it might have done during the campaign had there been no section
211-a. Having failed to set that out, the majority was in a position to
conclude the state law had no real impact on what employees learned
during the campaign and how they voted.
As noted earlier, both of these cases were not decided promptly,
and there have been concerns as to whether the substantial delay in
issuing these decisions frustrated employee choice. However, after the
Board's decision in Affiliated, the employer-which had been taken over
by a major corporation-responded favorably to the union's request to
In the
bargain, and negotiations for a contract are underway.
Independence case, the outcome for the employees who cast a majority
of votes for union representation is not as sanguine, since the victorious
union in the election has gone through some changes, and its successor

29. Id. at 5 (quoting General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948)).
30. Id.
31. See id
32. Id.
33. Id at 15 (Schaumber & Hayes, dissenting).
34. See id. at 4, 8. It should be noted that the employer could have hired a consultant with
non-state funds. Id at 8. Furthermore, telling and employer to vote "no" directly is not prohibited
by section 211-a. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2002).
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may not be interested in representing the employees in question.
Apart from the pending political elections, another much less
publicized issue has been the appointment of Lafe Solomon, a career
Board Attorney, as the Acting General Counsel of the Board. While it is
not clear how long he will serve, he has already expressed a desire to
invigorate and reform the NLRB 10(j) program.3 ' Accordingly, it seems
appropriate to mention two very recent 10(j) cases authorized by the
Board that arose in the Brooklyn office.
In NLRB v. One Stop Kosher Supermarket, Inc., Region 29 sought
10(j) relief to require the employer to bargain with the union after it
recognized the union and then refused to engage in negotiations for a
contract. The employer also refused to provide information to the union
that it had requested for bargaining.
On June 29, 2010, a federal
district court judge granted our request for 10(j) relief, and ordered the
employer to commence negotiations with the union for an initial contract
and to provide the requested information.38 Thereafter, the employer
complied with the court's order.
Interestingly, the court required the parties to immediately
commence negotiations for a contract out of concern that the Board may
not pass on the case promptly.39 However, it directed the parties not to
implement the terms of any collective bargaining agreement until the
Board rendered its decision in the underlying administrative hearing.40
While this was a novel approach toward possible Board delay, it was
also an odd way of dealing with the problem, given that the court found
that the irreparable harm which justified 10(j) relief was the loss of
benefits employees were experiencing because bargaining was not going
forward. 4 1 The district court noted that retroactive application of an
eventual contract was possible, but noted that the employer was not
guaranteeing that it would accede to such a demand.42 Further, Board
law precluded the Board from directing retroactive application of any

35. Section 10(j) enables the Board to petition any US district court for temporary relief or a
restraining order upon issuance of a complaint. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j)
(2006).
36. No. 10-CV-1956 (FB)(VVP), 2010 WL 2633856, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2010). The
ALJ has not issued his decision yet in this case, nor has the federal court ruled on our 10(j) case.
37. See id.
38. Id. at *5.
39. See id. at *4.
40. See id
41. See id at *34
42. Id. at *4.
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contract that might be negotiated. 43 Thus, in one stroke, the court noted
that employees are likely to suffer harm because of lost wages and
benefits but was willing to delay the receipt of any negotiated
improvements in their wages and benefits until the Board issued its
decision. As a practical matter, this concern was never realized, because
as of this writing, the Board's decision requiring bargaining with the
union has not been issued and no first contract has yet been reached.
The second 10(j) case of recent vintage out of the Brooklyn office
involved Jung Sun Laundry Group Corp., a company that launders
linens, tablecloths, and related items for a number of large hotels."
Here, the heart of our 10(j) case sought to require the employer to offer
reinstatement to about 103 strikers who were denied reinstatement after
they sought to return to work after a three-hour work stoppage. The
work stoppage was caused by the cessation of health insurance by the
union's Welfare Fund after the employer failed to make timely welfare
contributions on behalf of the unit employees. 45 At the time of the
strike, negotiations were in progress for a successor contract, but soon
after the failure to reinstate the strikers, negotiations ceased.
We argued that, as time passes, the union would experience
irreparable harm due to the predictable erosion of support as employees
are not reinstated. Moreover, with the passage of time, fewer victims of
discrimination will likely accept reinstatement once offered, because
they have lost interest in further employment, have accepted other jobs,
or have relocated. As a result, absent immediate offers of reinstatement,
the union will suffer loss of support among the unit and, as a
consequence thereof, will have increased difficulty in negotiating a
favorable successor contract thereby depriving employees of wage and
benefit improvements they might otherwise receive. Further, the failure
to immediately reinstate the strikers, we argued, sends the wrong
message to their replacements and decreases the likelihood that they
would be willing to support the union when the union returns to the
bargaining table. Finally, the failure to grant injunctive relief will mean
that an important aspect of the Board's relief will be rendered
meaningless as many of the discriminatees, months or years from now,
will no longer desire reinstatement.
On November 15, 2010, in an unpublished decision, Judge Carol B.
43. See id.
44. See Laundry, Dry Cleaning Workers & Allied Indus. Health Fund, Unite Here! v. Jung
Sun Laundry Grp. Corp., No. 08-CV-2771 (DLI) (RLM), 2009 WL 704723, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
16, 2009).
45. See id. at *1-2.
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Amon of the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York,
found that the Board had established reasonable cause to believe the
employer had violated the Act, as alleged, and that temporary relief was
just and proper.46 In granting the relief sought, the court noted that it was
appropriate to do so to insure that the striking employees return to work
and have healthcare coverage, and to avoid evictions among the striking
employees, pending the Board's administrative proceedings. 47 The
Court concluded that temporary relief was "just and proper to restore the
status quo, prevent irreparable harm, and further the ends of the National
Labor Relations Act." 4 8 Whether the court decision amounts to no more
than a pyrrhic victory will depend on whether the employer continues its
operations so that jobs are available for the 103 workers denied
reinstatement.

46. Blyer v. Jung Sun Laundry Grp. Corp., No. 10-CV-2975 (CBA), at 12 (E.D.N.Y filed
Nov. 15, 2010).

47. See id. at 15.
48.

Id. at 18.
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